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N

ot long ago, at a convention of political scientists, after a formal
discussion of the role of the judiciary had ended and the conversation had spilled over into a civil if quite animated debate, I overheard what seemed to me a very telling remark. In a final, somewhat
exasperated plea, one of the protagonists offered this distillation of his
concerns: “All we are asking is that restrictions on individual freedom
be based on reason.”
What, indeed, could be more . . . well, reasonable than the requirement that deliberations on disputed matters of public policy appeal to
the common ground of reason? The trouble is, though, that we seem
no longer to be in common possession of an understanding of reason
that is substantial enough to give us any guidance. To be sure, evidence
of the technological power of modern science pervades our existence,
and we trust the experts that the foundations of the scientific method
and of pure logical and mathematical reasoning are secure. But technology is a tool that cannot supply a purpose, any more than can logic
or mathematics.
Does anyone in fact believe in reason anymore—reason not only
as a formal method but as a substantive, authoritative principle? Do
we even know what it means, for ourselves as individuals or in our
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communities, to look to reason for guidance? Of course we know
how to appeal to the norm of rationality to disqualify arguments we
oppose, showing them to rely upon moral or religious beliefs, or other
inherited prejudices—that is, convictions or intimations that reason
cannot establish beyond doubt. But if this negative function is all that
remains of reason, then, short of an appeal to some nonrational guidance, are we not left truly destitute, unable even to hear the Socratic
question that gave rise to the Western idea of reason: how shall I live?
C. John Sommerville is convinced that we have indeed lost our
faith in reason and that this loss deeply undermines the integrity of
our universities. More precisely, the secular rationalism that presided
magisterially over the modern age and that marginalized religious
questions is now itself teetering. The moment is therefore ripe, the
author argues, for a reconsideration of the place of religion in higher
education. His reflections ought to be of deep, even urgent interest to
all who are committed to the ongoing project of faithful higher education that then President Jeffrey R. Holland once called “a school in
Zion.”
“My thesis,” Sommerville states, “is, first, that the secular university is increasingly marginal to American society and, second, that
this is a result of its secularism” (p. 4). When the modern, secular
American university was founded about a hundred years ago, the general hope and expectation, sometimes quite explicit, was that “professors would replace clergy as the official authorities on life’s questions”
(p. 8). In the contemporary, postsecular university, this ambition has
been all but completely abandoned, leaving only a complacent habit
or fashion of rationalism—a rationalism committed to the acidic criticism of all norms and institutions except those upon which university
intellectuals themselves depend. The decisive question—what does it
mean to be human?—is one that these intellectuals are utterly unable
even to ask. This, Sommerville argues, is because, in eliminating the
religious dimension of questioning, the secular university is approaching the point where it will have “eliminated the human distinction as
. Jeffrey R. Holland, “A School in Zion,” in Educating Zion, ed. John W. Welch and
Don E. Norton (Provo, UT: BYU Studies, 1996), 143–64; see Doctrine and Covenants 97:3.
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well”—have eliminated, that is, our very ability to articulate our own
humanity (p. 38). Sommerville does not shrink from the prescription
that follows quite evidently from this diagnosis: “The academy needs
to learn to speak theologically.”
It would be a big mistake, however, to assume that Sommerville has
in mind some completed theological system that he believes can give
an adequate account of human things. On the contrary, he criticizes
the notion of religions as “tight propositional systems,” or what John
Rawls, the most influential philosopher of secular liberal justice, called
“‘comprehensive views’” (p. 127). Sommerville prefers instead to see
religions as “perspectives” of inquiry, or as “narrative” traditions that
make it possible to explore the human condition in all its richness. It is
only by defying the barriers that have been built up between secular and
religious disciplines that “in the university today [we] could . . . face the
overwhelming question of human significance” (p. 33).
The walls defining a secular viewpoint are already falling all
around us, Sommerville observes. The fact/value dichotomy, or the
idea that the study of facts could be insulated altogether from questions of human meaning, is under pressure, not so much from external critiques, religious or otherwise, as from secular scholars including Hilary Putnam (philosophy), Amartya Sen (economics), and
Francis Fukuyama (intellectual and political history). Sommerville
summarizes Putnam’s argument, for example, in The Collapse of the
Fact/Value Dichotomy “that what we call ‘values’ are subject to the
same kind of objective consideration as what we call facts” (p. 42).
Once the collapse of this dichotomy registers in the university, the
door will be wide open to “debates involving values,” and so “religion
may be heard from in areas from which it was banished” (pp. 45, 46).
To be sure, we will be left without a universal method for settling such
debates. But this suits John Sommerville’s idea of higher education
just fine: whereas, since the Enlightenment, we have assumed that “we
should be striving to simplify,” “the task ahead will be to complexify
things” (p. 46).
If many old-fashioned secularists seem a bit defensive, even
desperate, these days—quick to associate their enemies with some
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threatening (though in reality very tiny and marginal) corps of theocratic fundamentalists and to link these in turn with Islamo-fascists—
this may be because they see or sense the walls safely enclosing their
rationalist realm crumbling around them. In a suggestive little chapter entitled “Science Gets Strange,” Sommerville points to evidence
that the barriers between thinking with maximum rigor and thinking
about human meaning are eroding even in what one might imagine
to be the safest stronghold of secular scientism—that is, the natural
sciences. At some point the question of humanity emerged at the furthest reaches of the physical sciences, in the form of an awareness of
dozens of astonishing “Anthropic Coincidences” that link the genesis
of reality as we know it to the requirements of the existence of human
beings and therefore of the human intellect. We seem thus to be seeing what might be called a Second Socratic Turning of the Western
Mind, as the most ambitious scientists are liberated to wonder at
“the universe’s becoming aware of itself through humanity” (p. 79).
“Thus,” Sommerville observes, “there is now wonder and mystery on
the boundaries of science that suggest a religious awareness if not a
religious response” (p. 77).
Just what reason might mean for us now, in this postsecularist era,
as we venture out beyond the once-comfortable confines of the fact/
value distinction, is of course an open question. Professor Sommer
ville is hardly to be blamed for failing to give a definitive answer. In a
difficult chapter on “Trouble Judging Religions,” he does seem to lose
control of his own argument somewhat as he implicitly confronts the
question of what standards or styles of judgment might emerge on
the horizon as we leave behind the clearly mapped terrain of secular
rationalism. Openness to religious sensibilities and insights does not
remove the necessity of exercising judgment. Thus the question we
now confront is “how to judge religion or religions and by what standards.” But here we realize that we are not sure even how to define
religion or whether belief-orientations of all peoples are adequately
addressed in terms of the Western understanding of religion, heavily
conditioned as this understanding is by a monotheistic tradition. Thus
Sommerville risks being unable to say just what it is toward which
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reason should now be open. At one point he seems to retreat behind a
clear distinction between belief and intelligence, arguing that “intelligence is built on belief,” and not the reverse (p. 64). But this is precisely
the dichotomy that grounds the rejected distinction between Is and
Ought, or between fact and value. By falling back on this distinction,
the author risks endorsing a relativistic irrationalism as the only alternative to rationalism.
The only way to avoid this vitiating recourse, I think, would be to
articulate candidly the insights available in a Christian understanding
of humanity and divinity (as the author often very promisingly begins
to do) and to be ready to stand by the judgments implicit in such
an understanding, at least until other insights grounded in another
tradition proved richer or more fecund. Sommerville’s Socratism is
Christian, and his Christianity is Socratic, and he should articulate
it and defend it as such, not as just one possible belief commitment
among many.
Prof. Sommerville’s sometimes spirited polemic will be welcomed
by many who promote the interests of religious universities, including
Brigham Young University—as well it should. But on closer inspection it should be clear that his book is as much a critique of “religious”
higher education as of secular. Both in fact have been impoverished by
taking for granted a stultifying distinction between faith and intellect.
If religious universities are not to justify the suspicions of would-be
rationalists, they must overcome their insularity and “take the intellectual dimension of their faith more seriously” (p. 58). This would
mean something much more than topping off a conventional, secular,
discipline-bound lesson with an edifying nod to the importance of
faith. If faith is really fundamental to understanding, then it might
be time, for example, to critically examine the narrowly rationalist
assumptions underlying the disciplines we are paid to promote. If we
are not teaching about secularism, Sommerville suggests, we are still
teaching secularism—teaching it all the more secularly, one might say,
because we are not aware of what we are teaching (p. 86). That such a
critical engagement with the assumptions buried in our conventional
disciplines might lead to confrontations with complacently secular
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accreditation agencies (p. 143) and “assessment” regimes (p. 139), and
with the consumerist, mercenary expectations of many of the university’s constituencies, might be regarded as additional benefits.
Sommerville’s call for mutual openness between study and faith
serves to remind us of the rich possibilities of “a school in Zion” and
of how far we still have to go even to begin realizing these possibilities.
Are we clamoring for passage on a sinking ship?

